This piece seems to be more a selective presentation and interpretation of information than a “debunking.” Importantly, the entire post is based on a single (albeit interesting and thought provoking) book with a specific perspective. Given that the topic discussed is hotly debated, its not clear to me why you leaned so heavily on this single perspective. Regardless, there are several claims in this piece that are misleading. While there may be others I have not addressed here, I believe the four points I discuss are sufficient to add important nuance to the narrative presented here. (Full disclosure: I, like most people, am opposed to the use of nuclear weapons.)
1) "...which is especially relevant at a time when the US government is planning to spend a staggering $1.7 trillion over the next decades to build new nuclear weapons that could endanger the survival of all life on this planet."
This claim is misleading for two reasons. First, the projected spending is $1.7 trillion over THREE decades. The use of "next decades," without specifying how many decades, is not only odd but may give a casual reader the impression that the US is projected to spend $1.7 trillion over the next decade – which would truly be a staggering amount! Admittedly, I had initially read the sentence as “next decade” myself. Second, the spending is for the modernization of nuclear weapons and associated INFRASTRUCTURE. This is important to note, as much of the spending will likely not be spent directly on weapons. It's also important to ask how the nuclear weapons are to be "modernized." For example, is it possible that their blast radius may be reduced to allow for selective, tactical use of these weapons which, while still deadly, would serve to significantly reduce their destructive capacity? This may not be the case, but this is one important question to ask before implying that the purpose of these modernization efforts is to further "endanger the survival of the planet."
2) “First, it is important to contextualize the Japanese situation and mindset in 1945. Japan was facing a hopeless situation in the war. It had lost most of its overseas territories, resources, and allies. It had suffered heavy casualties and damage from conventional bombing raids by the US…Japan was aware of its inevitable defeat, but it was reluctant to accept unconditional surrender, which was demanded by US President Harry Truman, because it feared that it would mean the abolition of its monarchy and the execution of its emperor, whom the Japanese population at the time essentially revered as a god.”
Several inaccuracies and omissions here which are important to consider to fully contextualize Japan’s situation in 1945. First, contrary to the claim made in this paragraph, Japan still had control over most of its imperial territory by August 1945. Large swaths of East and Southeast Asia were still occupied by millions of Japanese troops. Second, how is “conventional bombing raids” defined here? What is “conventional” about carpet bombing a city? Tokyo was essentially wiped off the map in March 1945. By the standards of the time, what makes that “conventional” but not the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which had a much lower immediate death toll than the bombing of Tokyo? If the idea is to judge mid-20th century warfare (which was quite primitive) by 21st century standards, then I would argue neither are conventional nor acceptable. If the idea is to provide context, then this framing is utterly misleading. Third, Japan’s situation was hopeless a long time prior to 1945. By 1944, the United States had established air and naval superiority and Japan was unable to launch any major counter offensives. However, the Japanese were hoping to obtain more favorable peace terms (e.g., maintaining their colonies in Korea and Taiwan, maintaining a military, protecting the military junta) by raising the cost of prolonging the war for the allies through steadfast resistance. It is not true that their only concern was the emperor’s wellbeing throughout 1945 and up to August of that year (though this was a major concern). There was a firm belief among many in the ruling military junta of Japan that the US could still be brought to the negotiating table if the costs of further incursions into Japanese occupied territory or an invasion of the Japanese homelands were raised. In fact, up until the day that Japan ultimately surrendered – a week after two nuclear bombings and the Soviet declaration of war – half of Japan’s ruling military council still refused to surrender (a majority vote was needed) and ultimately the emperor himself had to intervene to break the deadlock (going so far as to take the unprecedented step of addressing the nation himself).
3) The entire section titled: “The US’s Knowledge and Options to End the War without the Bomb”
What is the point of this section? Presidents have many advisors and hear many different perspectives. A set of cherry picked quotes does not imply that Truman had full and complete information to make any decision with absolute certainty. We have the benefit of hindsight and can use our imaginations to consider all sorts of different scenarios at no cost, human or otherwise. But Truman did not have that luxury and he was undoubtedly receiving information pulling in both directions, including death toll estimates should the war continue through the end of 1945. Interestingly, one of the sources you pulled from Stone’s book makes it clear that Truman’s decision was not going to be an easy one: “On July 6, the US military’s intelligence assessment was ‘an entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat.’ But it added that ‘the Japanese believe that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction.’” Based on this assessment, it's clear that Truman was still getting conflicting information about whether Japan had even accepted that its defeat was inevitable a month before the nuclear bombings. Furthermore, one might interpret this information as implying that even the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan may not force their unconditional surrender because the Japanese may choose to continue fighting to avoid what they would perceive to be “national extinction.”
4) The sections titled: “The Motives Behind the Atomic Bombings” and “The Military and Moral Opposition to the Atomic Bomb by Truman’s Top Commanders”
Again, more selective quoting, with many of these coming after the war had ended and with the benefit of hindsight. Also, it's important to note that Eisenhower and McArthur were both involved in debates about whether to deploy nuclear weapons during the Korean war, and Eisenhower, as president, publicly threatened to use them against the Chinese during that war. Furthermore, quotes in which general’s acknowledge that Japan was essentially defeated aren’t surprising. There was absolutely no doubt among the allies that Japan’s defeat was inevitable by 1945. The important question was WHEN Japan could be made to surrender and at what cost. To put this cost into perspective, in the <30 days of fighting between the Soviet Union and Japan after the former’s declaration of war on the latter in August 1945, nearly 100,000 people were killed or wounded. If the fighting in Manchuria, and the rest of East and Southeast Asia had continued for several more months (including the invasion of the Japanese home islands), many hundreds of thousands more soldiers and civilians would likely have perished. Additionally, millions were already starving within Japan and in its occupied territories, and it's likely that many hundreds of thousands if not millions would have died due to famine if the war would have continued.
Thank you for your comment. I appreciate your feedback and your interest in the topic. However, I disagree with your arguments.
You have challenged my factual sentence that the US government is planning to spend roughly $1.7 trillion over the next decades on “modernizing” nuclear weapons. You have claimed that this sentence is misleading for two reasons: first, because the projected spending is over three decades, not one; and second, because the spending is for the modernization of nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, not for building new nuclear weapons. You have also implied that the modernization of nuclear weapons could make them safer or less destructive, which betrays the fact that you are unaware of the heightened danger and risks of this development.
First, you are correct that the projected spending is over three decades, not one. However, this does not make my sentence misleading, as I did not specify how many decades in my sentence. I used the plural form of “decades” to indicate more than one decade, which is accurate.
Moreover, this does not change the fact that $1.7 trillion is a staggering amount of money to spend on nuclear weapons. This amount should be spent on necessary and beneficial causes, such as health care, education, or climate change mitigation. According to a report by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the US spent $35.4 billion on nuclear weapons in 2019 alone, which could have paid for 300,000 ICU beds; 150,000 nurses; 75,000 doctors; and 35,000 ventilators to address the COVID19 pandemic. (https://www.icanw.org/ican_releases_2019_nuclear_weapons_spending_research)
Second, you are wrong to suggest that the spending is for the modernization of nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, not for building new nuclear weapons. The US nuclear modernization program includes developing and deploying new types of nuclear warheads and delivery systems that would increase the size and diversity of the US nuclear arsenal.
For example, the US plans to produce a new low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead (W76-2), a new air-launched cruise missile warhead (W80-4), a new intercontinental ballistic missile warhead (W87-1), and a new sea-launched cruise missile warhead (W93). These new warheads would not only replace existing ones, but also add new capabilities and roles for nuclear weapons in US strategy. The US also plans to build new delivery systems for these warheads, such as a new class of ballistic missile submarines (Columbia), a new set of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (Ground Based Strategic Deterrent), a new nuclear cruise missile (Long-Range Standoff Weapon), a new stealthy long-range strike bomber (B-21), and a new sea-launched cruise missile. (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization)
Notably, these new ICBMS could each carry up to three warheads 20 times more powerful than the atomic bombs the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Third, you are mistaken to imply that the modernization of nuclear weapons could make them safer or less destructive. On the contrary, the modernization of nuclear weapons could make them more dangerous and destabilizing. According to a report by the Arms Control Association (ACA), some of the proposed modernization efforts, such as developing new low-yield nuclear warheads or increasing the accuracy and speed of delivery systems, could lower the threshold for nuclear use and increase the risk of nuclear escalation. For example, low-yield nuclear warheads could blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons and create ambiguity and uncertainty in a crisis situation. They could also tempt military commanders to use them in a limited or tactical way, which could escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. Similarly, accurate and fast delivery systems could create pressure for rapid decision-making and preemptive strikes in a conflict scenario. They could also undermine strategic stability and arms control agreements by enabling counterforce attacks against adversary’s nuclear forces.
You have also challenged my historical analysis and moral critique of Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs against Japan. You have claimed that my analysis is based on a single book with a specific perspective, and that my critique is based on cherry picked quotes and hindsight bias. You have also claimed that Japan’s surrender was not inevitable, and that using atomic bombs was necessary to end the war quickly and save lives.
First, my analysis is based on official documents, memoirs, interviews, reports, and studies—all included in the footnotes—that corroborate and complement the information and arguments presented in the book. The book itself is based on extensive and rigorous research and analysis, drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources.
Second, you are wrong to suggest that my critique is based on cherry picked quotes and hindsight bias. I have used quotes from some of the most prominent and influential figures in Truman’s administration and the US military, such as Leahy, Stimson, Grew, Eisenhower, and MacArthur, as well as US intelligence assessments at the time.
Truman was not unaware or uninformed of these views, but rather chose to disregard them and not alter his demand for unconditional surrender before his decision to use the bomb. He also did not have to rely on hindsight or imagination, as he had access to reliable intelligence and diplomatic sources that indicated Japan’s readiness to surrender if they could keep their emperor. The quotes I used are not cherry picked or irrelevant, but rather representative and relevant.
Third, the historical evidence suggests that you are wrong to suggest that Japan’s surrender was not inevitable in the face of the Soviet invasion, and that using atomic bombs was necessary to prevent giving territorial concessions to Japan. Japan had lost most of its overseas resources, such as oil, rubber, and iron ore, due to Allied blockades and bombings. Japan also faced severe food shortages and famine at home. Japan had also lost its allies, such as Germany and Italy, who had surrendered or been defeated by the Allies. Japan was essentially isolated and surrounded by enemies who had superior military and economic power. The Soviets overran Japanese territorial possessions in Manchuria and Korea on August 9, which the Japanese later said was the decisive factor in their surrender terms, as top US military commanders and intelligence assessment had predicted.
By conventional bombing raids, I meant bombing raids that used non-nuclear explosives, such as high-explosive bombs or incendiary bombs. These raids were also horrific and caused massive civilian casualties and damage. However, there is a qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear bombing, and there is a distinction made between them in the research and literature.
This historical record, based on official documents, memoirs, interviews, reports, and studies, reveal that using atomic bombs was not necessary to end the war. As I have shown in my post, there were other options besides using atomic bombs or continuing the war indefinitely. One of these options was to modify the demand for unconditional surrender and assure Japan that they could keep their emperor.
Furthermore, the historical record reveals the geopolitical and strategic factors that influenced Truman’s decision to use the bomb.
The evidence suggests that Truman, Groves, Byrnes, etc. were primarily motivated in using the bomb as a geopolitical and strategic move to demonstrate the US’s power in the post-war world. They were an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union and create a new US-dominated world order.
I appreciate your response but we can’t have a meaningful exchange if you misrepresent my points. Fortunately, this is all in writing so I and others can refer to exactly what I had said above. I think it would be helpful for you to re-read my initial comments and reassess before reviewing my comments below. If you choose to respond, it would also be helpful if you quote me directly to avoid any misunderstandings.
1) I challenged the choice to use the odd wording of “next decades” rather than specifying the number of decades. As I mentioned, a casual reader may mistakenly read your sentence as $1.7 trillion in spending over the “next decade” (which, as I stated, is exactly what I did before I did a double take). You did leave out the fact that the spending is on modernization of nuclear weapons AND associated infrastructure - an important point of clarification.
2) Why do you assume my use of “modernization” doesn’t include the development of new weapons? I certainly never made such a claim, please re-read my comment.
3) I did not just imply that “modernization” could mean that nuclear weapons may be made less destructive, I specifically used it as an example of what “modernization” could mean. And my example seems to have hit the nail on the head as the modernization does include the development of LOW-YIELD nuclear weapons - a much more preferable alternative to the massively more destructive Cold War era nuclear weapons that will hopefully be decommissioned.
4) The potential implications of having lower-yield nuclear weapons is a separate matter from the actual destructive power of those weapons. In your post, you implied the nuclear weapons themselves would “endanger survival of all life on the planet.” Critics may certainly argue that these lower-yield weapons may make their use more likely but that is, afterall, just speculation. It's not clear to me that the world will necessarily become significantly more dangerous than it already has been for the past ~80 years. It is my understanding that lower-yield tactical nuclear missiles are already in service not only in the United States but in other nuclear armed countries as well.
5) There will always be debates about how federal spending should be allocated, that's fine. However I’m not sure that’s a productive avenue for discussing the issue at hand. Similarly, whether $1.7 trillion over three decades (~$57 billion a years) is a “staggering amount” is a subjective matter, so I’m also not sure that’s a useful point of debate. However, I think it's important to contextualize that amount as a share of total US federal government spending. At average projected annual spending levels, ~$57 billion is about ~1% of the US budget ($6 trillion) for fiscal year 2023, and this share will shrink as the US budget grows overtime absent additional appropriations for the modernization. At current spending levels, in the same time frame (three decades), the US will have spent more than $3 trillion on food assistance, more than $48 trillion on healthcare, and more than $2 trillion on K-12 education ($23 trillion including state and local spending). I could go on but you get the point.
6) I did not claim that your summary is based on a single book, you did. I quote: “I have gathered this information from the superb book by prominent historian Peter Kuznick and celebrated filmmaker Oliver Stone, called ‘The Untold History of the United States.’”
7) Cherry picking quotes has nothing to do with the quality of the documentation or status of the person being quoted. I have no doubt that the book is extensively sourced. Cherry picking is when you selectively present one set of facts while excluding others. Surely we can both agree that these were not the only people who ever commented on the decision to drop the nuclear weapons, or the only people to have advised Truman, right?
8) We all suffer from hindsight bias when trying to adjudicate past historical decisions, including many of the people (with reputations at stake) who were quoted years after the war had ended. The important thing is to recognize that and try and account for it.
9) I never claimed that Japan’s surrender was “not inevitable.” It was a matter of WHEN Japan would surrender, not IF Japan would surrender. Please re-read my comment.
10) Again, I never claimed that Truman was “unaware or uninformed” of views against dropping the bombs. I said that he was getting information pulling in different directions, which he certainly was. You even pulled a quote from the book that clearly suggested this was the case, as I pointed out. I also never claimed that Truman had to rely on hindsight and imagination. Rather, I said that WE have the benefit of hindsight and can use our imaginations, a luxury that HE did not have. Please re-read my comment.
11) ….sigh…again, I never claimed that Japan’s surrender was not inevitable or that nuclear weapons were necessary to prevent territorial concessions to Japan. I just pointed out that you were wrong in suggesting that Japan’s ONLY concern was the emperor leading up to August 1945. Please re-read my comment.
12) I still don’t understand how, in your view, it's “conventional” to destroy a city and kill one hundred thousand people in a single night with many thousands of bombs as compared to doing so with a single bomb. Also, carpet bombing was also a new tactic first implemented en masse during WWII, so by definition it was not a “conventional” part of warfare even then. As I said in my comment, if your point was to judge mid-20th century warfare by 21st century standards, which it seems it was, then it's a silly distinction to make.
13) Once more, nuclear weapons were not necessary to end the war. Japan’s defeat was inevitable. Please, re-read my comment. The war could have been won by blockading Japan and starving the population to death, or by invading the Japanese home islands, or by continuing to “conventionally” bomb Japan from the air, or any other number of ways. But that misses the point. WE DON’T KNOW WHAT THE COUNTERFACTUAL WOULD HAVE BEEN. The important question is to ask whether its possible that more people would have died had the nuclear bombs not been dropped and the war continued for another few months or through the end of 1945. There is a strong case to be made that had the war continued through the end of 1945, then many hundreds of thousands or millions more would have died.
14) The decision to drop the nuclear bombings surely served multiple purposes, as many decisions do, but it's important to note that the Soviets already knew that the US possessed nuclear weapons. Truman himself implied as much to Stalin a month before they were dropped.
This piece seems to be more a selective presentation and interpretation of information than a “debunking.” Importantly, the entire post is based on a single (albeit interesting and thought provoking) book with a specific perspective. Given that the topic discussed is hotly debated, its not clear to me why you leaned so heavily on this single perspective. Regardless, there are several claims in this piece that are misleading. While there may be others I have not addressed here, I believe the four points I discuss are sufficient to add important nuance to the narrative presented here. (Full disclosure: I, like most people, am opposed to the use of nuclear weapons.)
1) "...which is especially relevant at a time when the US government is planning to spend a staggering $1.7 trillion over the next decades to build new nuclear weapons that could endanger the survival of all life on this planet."
This claim is misleading for two reasons. First, the projected spending is $1.7 trillion over THREE decades. The use of "next decades," without specifying how many decades, is not only odd but may give a casual reader the impression that the US is projected to spend $1.7 trillion over the next decade – which would truly be a staggering amount! Admittedly, I had initially read the sentence as “next decade” myself. Second, the spending is for the modernization of nuclear weapons and associated INFRASTRUCTURE. This is important to note, as much of the spending will likely not be spent directly on weapons. It's also important to ask how the nuclear weapons are to be "modernized." For example, is it possible that their blast radius may be reduced to allow for selective, tactical use of these weapons which, while still deadly, would serve to significantly reduce their destructive capacity? This may not be the case, but this is one important question to ask before implying that the purpose of these modernization efforts is to further "endanger the survival of the planet."
2) “First, it is important to contextualize the Japanese situation and mindset in 1945. Japan was facing a hopeless situation in the war. It had lost most of its overseas territories, resources, and allies. It had suffered heavy casualties and damage from conventional bombing raids by the US…Japan was aware of its inevitable defeat, but it was reluctant to accept unconditional surrender, which was demanded by US President Harry Truman, because it feared that it would mean the abolition of its monarchy and the execution of its emperor, whom the Japanese population at the time essentially revered as a god.”
Several inaccuracies and omissions here which are important to consider to fully contextualize Japan’s situation in 1945. First, contrary to the claim made in this paragraph, Japan still had control over most of its imperial territory by August 1945. Large swaths of East and Southeast Asia were still occupied by millions of Japanese troops. Second, how is “conventional bombing raids” defined here? What is “conventional” about carpet bombing a city? Tokyo was essentially wiped off the map in March 1945. By the standards of the time, what makes that “conventional” but not the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which had a much lower immediate death toll than the bombing of Tokyo? If the idea is to judge mid-20th century warfare (which was quite primitive) by 21st century standards, then I would argue neither are conventional nor acceptable. If the idea is to provide context, then this framing is utterly misleading. Third, Japan’s situation was hopeless a long time prior to 1945. By 1944, the United States had established air and naval superiority and Japan was unable to launch any major counter offensives. However, the Japanese were hoping to obtain more favorable peace terms (e.g., maintaining their colonies in Korea and Taiwan, maintaining a military, protecting the military junta) by raising the cost of prolonging the war for the allies through steadfast resistance. It is not true that their only concern was the emperor’s wellbeing throughout 1945 and up to August of that year (though this was a major concern). There was a firm belief among many in the ruling military junta of Japan that the US could still be brought to the negotiating table if the costs of further incursions into Japanese occupied territory or an invasion of the Japanese homelands were raised. In fact, up until the day that Japan ultimately surrendered – a week after two nuclear bombings and the Soviet declaration of war – half of Japan’s ruling military council still refused to surrender (a majority vote was needed) and ultimately the emperor himself had to intervene to break the deadlock (going so far as to take the unprecedented step of addressing the nation himself).
3) The entire section titled: “The US’s Knowledge and Options to End the War without the Bomb”
What is the point of this section? Presidents have many advisors and hear many different perspectives. A set of cherry picked quotes does not imply that Truman had full and complete information to make any decision with absolute certainty. We have the benefit of hindsight and can use our imaginations to consider all sorts of different scenarios at no cost, human or otherwise. But Truman did not have that luxury and he was undoubtedly receiving information pulling in both directions, including death toll estimates should the war continue through the end of 1945. Interestingly, one of the sources you pulled from Stone’s book makes it clear that Truman’s decision was not going to be an easy one: “On July 6, the US military’s intelligence assessment was ‘an entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat.’ But it added that ‘the Japanese believe that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction.’” Based on this assessment, it's clear that Truman was still getting conflicting information about whether Japan had even accepted that its defeat was inevitable a month before the nuclear bombings. Furthermore, one might interpret this information as implying that even the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan may not force their unconditional surrender because the Japanese may choose to continue fighting to avoid what they would perceive to be “national extinction.”
4) The sections titled: “The Motives Behind the Atomic Bombings” and “The Military and Moral Opposition to the Atomic Bomb by Truman’s Top Commanders”
Again, more selective quoting, with many of these coming after the war had ended and with the benefit of hindsight. Also, it's important to note that Eisenhower and McArthur were both involved in debates about whether to deploy nuclear weapons during the Korean war, and Eisenhower, as president, publicly threatened to use them against the Chinese during that war. Furthermore, quotes in which general’s acknowledge that Japan was essentially defeated aren’t surprising. There was absolutely no doubt among the allies that Japan’s defeat was inevitable by 1945. The important question was WHEN Japan could be made to surrender and at what cost. To put this cost into perspective, in the <30 days of fighting between the Soviet Union and Japan after the former’s declaration of war on the latter in August 1945, nearly 100,000 people were killed or wounded. If the fighting in Manchuria, and the rest of East and Southeast Asia had continued for several more months (including the invasion of the Japanese home islands), many hundreds of thousands more soldiers and civilians would likely have perished. Additionally, millions were already starving within Japan and in its occupied territories, and it's likely that many hundreds of thousands if not millions would have died due to famine if the war would have continued.
Thank you for your comment. I appreciate your feedback and your interest in the topic. However, I disagree with your arguments.
You have challenged my factual sentence that the US government is planning to spend roughly $1.7 trillion over the next decades on “modernizing” nuclear weapons. You have claimed that this sentence is misleading for two reasons: first, because the projected spending is over three decades, not one; and second, because the spending is for the modernization of nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, not for building new nuclear weapons. You have also implied that the modernization of nuclear weapons could make them safer or less destructive, which betrays the fact that you are unaware of the heightened danger and risks of this development.
First, you are correct that the projected spending is over three decades, not one. However, this does not make my sentence misleading, as I did not specify how many decades in my sentence. I used the plural form of “decades” to indicate more than one decade, which is accurate.
Moreover, this does not change the fact that $1.7 trillion is a staggering amount of money to spend on nuclear weapons. This amount should be spent on necessary and beneficial causes, such as health care, education, or climate change mitigation. According to a report by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the US spent $35.4 billion on nuclear weapons in 2019 alone, which could have paid for 300,000 ICU beds; 150,000 nurses; 75,000 doctors; and 35,000 ventilators to address the COVID19 pandemic. (https://www.icanw.org/ican_releases_2019_nuclear_weapons_spending_research)
Second, you are wrong to suggest that the spending is for the modernization of nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, not for building new nuclear weapons. The US nuclear modernization program includes developing and deploying new types of nuclear warheads and delivery systems that would increase the size and diversity of the US nuclear arsenal.
For example, the US plans to produce a new low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead (W76-2), a new air-launched cruise missile warhead (W80-4), a new intercontinental ballistic missile warhead (W87-1), and a new sea-launched cruise missile warhead (W93). These new warheads would not only replace existing ones, but also add new capabilities and roles for nuclear weapons in US strategy. The US also plans to build new delivery systems for these warheads, such as a new class of ballistic missile submarines (Columbia), a new set of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (Ground Based Strategic Deterrent), a new nuclear cruise missile (Long-Range Standoff Weapon), a new stealthy long-range strike bomber (B-21), and a new sea-launched cruise missile. (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization)
Notably, these new ICBMS could each carry up to three warheads 20 times more powerful than the atomic bombs the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Third, you are mistaken to imply that the modernization of nuclear weapons could make them safer or less destructive. On the contrary, the modernization of nuclear weapons could make them more dangerous and destabilizing. According to a report by the Arms Control Association (ACA), some of the proposed modernization efforts, such as developing new low-yield nuclear warheads or increasing the accuracy and speed of delivery systems, could lower the threshold for nuclear use and increase the risk of nuclear escalation. For example, low-yield nuclear warheads could blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons and create ambiguity and uncertainty in a crisis situation. They could also tempt military commanders to use them in a limited or tactical way, which could escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. Similarly, accurate and fast delivery systems could create pressure for rapid decision-making and preemptive strikes in a conflict scenario. They could also undermine strategic stability and arms control agreements by enabling counterforce attacks against adversary’s nuclear forces.
You have also challenged my historical analysis and moral critique of Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs against Japan. You have claimed that my analysis is based on a single book with a specific perspective, and that my critique is based on cherry picked quotes and hindsight bias. You have also claimed that Japan’s surrender was not inevitable, and that using atomic bombs was necessary to end the war quickly and save lives.
First, my analysis is based on official documents, memoirs, interviews, reports, and studies—all included in the footnotes—that corroborate and complement the information and arguments presented in the book. The book itself is based on extensive and rigorous research and analysis, drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources.
Second, you are wrong to suggest that my critique is based on cherry picked quotes and hindsight bias. I have used quotes from some of the most prominent and influential figures in Truman’s administration and the US military, such as Leahy, Stimson, Grew, Eisenhower, and MacArthur, as well as US intelligence assessments at the time.
Truman was not unaware or uninformed of these views, but rather chose to disregard them and not alter his demand for unconditional surrender before his decision to use the bomb. He also did not have to rely on hindsight or imagination, as he had access to reliable intelligence and diplomatic sources that indicated Japan’s readiness to surrender if they could keep their emperor. The quotes I used are not cherry picked or irrelevant, but rather representative and relevant.
Third, the historical evidence suggests that you are wrong to suggest that Japan’s surrender was not inevitable in the face of the Soviet invasion, and that using atomic bombs was necessary to prevent giving territorial concessions to Japan. Japan had lost most of its overseas resources, such as oil, rubber, and iron ore, due to Allied blockades and bombings. Japan also faced severe food shortages and famine at home. Japan had also lost its allies, such as Germany and Italy, who had surrendered or been defeated by the Allies. Japan was essentially isolated and surrounded by enemies who had superior military and economic power. The Soviets overran Japanese territorial possessions in Manchuria and Korea on August 9, which the Japanese later said was the decisive factor in their surrender terms, as top US military commanders and intelligence assessment had predicted.
By conventional bombing raids, I meant bombing raids that used non-nuclear explosives, such as high-explosive bombs or incendiary bombs. These raids were also horrific and caused massive civilian casualties and damage. However, there is a qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear bombing, and there is a distinction made between them in the research and literature.
This historical record, based on official documents, memoirs, interviews, reports, and studies, reveal that using atomic bombs was not necessary to end the war. As I have shown in my post, there were other options besides using atomic bombs or continuing the war indefinitely. One of these options was to modify the demand for unconditional surrender and assure Japan that they could keep their emperor.
Furthermore, the historical record reveals the geopolitical and strategic factors that influenced Truman’s decision to use the bomb.
The evidence suggests that Truman, Groves, Byrnes, etc. were primarily motivated in using the bomb as a geopolitical and strategic move to demonstrate the US’s power in the post-war world. They were an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union and create a new US-dominated world order.
I appreciate your response but we can’t have a meaningful exchange if you misrepresent my points. Fortunately, this is all in writing so I and others can refer to exactly what I had said above. I think it would be helpful for you to re-read my initial comments and reassess before reviewing my comments below. If you choose to respond, it would also be helpful if you quote me directly to avoid any misunderstandings.
1) I challenged the choice to use the odd wording of “next decades” rather than specifying the number of decades. As I mentioned, a casual reader may mistakenly read your sentence as $1.7 trillion in spending over the “next decade” (which, as I stated, is exactly what I did before I did a double take). You did leave out the fact that the spending is on modernization of nuclear weapons AND associated infrastructure - an important point of clarification.
2) Why do you assume my use of “modernization” doesn’t include the development of new weapons? I certainly never made such a claim, please re-read my comment.
3) I did not just imply that “modernization” could mean that nuclear weapons may be made less destructive, I specifically used it as an example of what “modernization” could mean. And my example seems to have hit the nail on the head as the modernization does include the development of LOW-YIELD nuclear weapons - a much more preferable alternative to the massively more destructive Cold War era nuclear weapons that will hopefully be decommissioned.
4) The potential implications of having lower-yield nuclear weapons is a separate matter from the actual destructive power of those weapons. In your post, you implied the nuclear weapons themselves would “endanger survival of all life on the planet.” Critics may certainly argue that these lower-yield weapons may make their use more likely but that is, afterall, just speculation. It's not clear to me that the world will necessarily become significantly more dangerous than it already has been for the past ~80 years. It is my understanding that lower-yield tactical nuclear missiles are already in service not only in the United States but in other nuclear armed countries as well.
5) There will always be debates about how federal spending should be allocated, that's fine. However I’m not sure that’s a productive avenue for discussing the issue at hand. Similarly, whether $1.7 trillion over three decades (~$57 billion a years) is a “staggering amount” is a subjective matter, so I’m also not sure that’s a useful point of debate. However, I think it's important to contextualize that amount as a share of total US federal government spending. At average projected annual spending levels, ~$57 billion is about ~1% of the US budget ($6 trillion) for fiscal year 2023, and this share will shrink as the US budget grows overtime absent additional appropriations for the modernization. At current spending levels, in the same time frame (three decades), the US will have spent more than $3 trillion on food assistance, more than $48 trillion on healthcare, and more than $2 trillion on K-12 education ($23 trillion including state and local spending). I could go on but you get the point.
6) I did not claim that your summary is based on a single book, you did. I quote: “I have gathered this information from the superb book by prominent historian Peter Kuznick and celebrated filmmaker Oliver Stone, called ‘The Untold History of the United States.’”
7) Cherry picking quotes has nothing to do with the quality of the documentation or status of the person being quoted. I have no doubt that the book is extensively sourced. Cherry picking is when you selectively present one set of facts while excluding others. Surely we can both agree that these were not the only people who ever commented on the decision to drop the nuclear weapons, or the only people to have advised Truman, right?
8) We all suffer from hindsight bias when trying to adjudicate past historical decisions, including many of the people (with reputations at stake) who were quoted years after the war had ended. The important thing is to recognize that and try and account for it.
9) I never claimed that Japan’s surrender was “not inevitable.” It was a matter of WHEN Japan would surrender, not IF Japan would surrender. Please re-read my comment.
10) Again, I never claimed that Truman was “unaware or uninformed” of views against dropping the bombs. I said that he was getting information pulling in different directions, which he certainly was. You even pulled a quote from the book that clearly suggested this was the case, as I pointed out. I also never claimed that Truman had to rely on hindsight and imagination. Rather, I said that WE have the benefit of hindsight and can use our imaginations, a luxury that HE did not have. Please re-read my comment.
11) ….sigh…again, I never claimed that Japan’s surrender was not inevitable or that nuclear weapons were necessary to prevent territorial concessions to Japan. I just pointed out that you were wrong in suggesting that Japan’s ONLY concern was the emperor leading up to August 1945. Please re-read my comment.
12) I still don’t understand how, in your view, it's “conventional” to destroy a city and kill one hundred thousand people in a single night with many thousands of bombs as compared to doing so with a single bomb. Also, carpet bombing was also a new tactic first implemented en masse during WWII, so by definition it was not a “conventional” part of warfare even then. As I said in my comment, if your point was to judge mid-20th century warfare by 21st century standards, which it seems it was, then it's a silly distinction to make.
13) Once more, nuclear weapons were not necessary to end the war. Japan’s defeat was inevitable. Please, re-read my comment. The war could have been won by blockading Japan and starving the population to death, or by invading the Japanese home islands, or by continuing to “conventionally” bomb Japan from the air, or any other number of ways. But that misses the point. WE DON’T KNOW WHAT THE COUNTERFACTUAL WOULD HAVE BEEN. The important question is to ask whether its possible that more people would have died had the nuclear bombs not been dropped and the war continued for another few months or through the end of 1945. There is a strong case to be made that had the war continued through the end of 1945, then many hundreds of thousands or millions more would have died.
14) The decision to drop the nuclear bombings surely served multiple purposes, as many decisions do, but it's important to note that the Soviets already knew that the US possessed nuclear weapons. Truman himself implied as much to Stalin a month before they were dropped.